"I think that we're on the runway, in brief, and I think we're on the runway because there is a delegation just arrived in Washington, led by Ron Derma and with Hanbbe and the head of the atomic energy commission in Israel. They're going to be doing the rounds of Washington to say that Iran cannot be allowed to drag this out."
The February 2025 Israeli delegation visit to Washington is confirmed by multiple sources, though interpretations differ sharply. Western reports emphasize technical coordination on nuclear matters, while non-Western accounts portray this as political pressure. The inclusion of atomic energy officials suggests discussions went beyond typical diplomatic exchanges.
"And they are saying, and it seems to be confirmed by everything we see, that there is an understanding with the United States—a formal understanding with the United States—that spring is the deadline (whatever spring means exactly). But they're saying spring is the deadline for making the decision."
The spring 2025 deadline appears grounded in the JCPOA's snapback mechanism expiration (October 2025), requiring 6-month procedural lead time. However, the political framing of this technical deadline remains contested, with Western sources presenting it as necessary planning and non-Western sources as artificial pressure tactic.
"So what is that likely? Why spring? Why are we getting in this way? It's probably because the snapback provisions of the JCPOA expire in October. And if snapback were to be initiated, there is a procedure before that can go through, which is a little bit time-consuming... When sanctions are resumed, it's automatic. It's not the normal Security Council resolution. It is a thing that was devised by the Americans during the Obama administration that meant there was automaticity in it—that it couldn't be vetoed by the others."
The JCPOA's snapback mechanism indeed sunsets in October 2025, creating procedural urgency in spring 2025. While the mechanism's technical operation is well-documented, its current legal applicability after U.S. withdrawal remains internationally contested, with Western and non-Western sources taking fundamentally opposed positions.
"So I think this is driving the timetable of the Iran attack. And we had it spelled out very clearly to us, I think, by Wals, what's going on last Sunday. Wals boasted about the multiple Anglo-US air strikes that took out top Houthi officials, making very clear that this was all about Iran. Quoting: 'This was an overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out.'"
The March 2025 Anglo-American strikes against Houthi leadership occurred as described, though their characterization differs radically. Western sources emphasize precision and Iranian connections, while non-Western reports frame them as unlawful killings. The operational success versus strategic impact remains debated.
"And the difference here—the difference being between this approach and Biden's approach (he doesn't say that, but that's what it means)—is one, going after the Houthi leadership, and two, holding Iran responsible for what happens. But this is, I think, the key because there's some things that are underpinning American policy and thinking about at this moment."
A demonstrable shift toward leadership targeting has emerged in U.S. military strategy by early 2025. While Western sources present this as tactical innovation, non-Western accounts uniformly condemn it as unlawful. The legal and strategic implications of this shift remain hotly debated internationally.